Evolutionary psychology claims that human cognition results from adaptations to ancestral environments. We have computational limits that make us myopic because farsighted traits made no sense when humans had limited technologies and chances of interaction. We are biased and tribalistic because in small, closely genetically related tribal groups, limited prosocial traits like kin altruism and in-group reciprocity increased survival and reproduction, while greater inclusivity and cooperation was costly and dangerous. Several scholars argue that shortsightedness and tribalism are rigidly embedded in our genes and hard-wired into our brains: in a world that changed dramatically and rapidly, our Stone Age minds struggle to address problems that are vastly different from those they evolved to meet. This book challenges the view that human psychology is fixed by our evolutionary past, highlighting the fallacies of an adaptationist approach to the moral mind. Human cognition has changed significantly since the Pleistocene, especially over the last few centuries and decades. There is no fixed and universal psychology, and no reason to believe that further shifts toward greater cooperation, inclusivity, and trust cannot occur in the future.